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Abstract
This research investigates the role of passwords and passphrases as
valid authentication methodologies. Specifically, this research dispels ear-
lier work that ignores information-theoretic lessons learned from cognitive
and social psychology and psycholinguistics, and extends and enriches the
current password security model.
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1 Introduction
Computer security has traditionally been technology- or system-oriented. This
approach has resulted in ingenious solutions to critical issues as user authenti-
cation, key distribution, and key expiration, but these solutions typically come
yoked to new problems for computer users and administrative staff alike. In
recent years, biometric measures have been gaining popularity for user authen-
tication, but use of such devices may give rise to a false sense of security: it
has been possible to authenticate an artificial ”finger” through use of various
materials over the past few years. Materials and methods used range from
”gummy” [1] or ”putty” [Burt, 2004] products to mold a fingerprint, to use of
cyanoacrylate (”CA”, or super glue) [2] and photo-lithography [1] to lift and
reproduce latent fingerprints for later presentation. Unless exceptional care is
taken with the planning and implementation process, ”hard” biometrics as fin-
gerprints present a significant security challenge. A better biometric has come in
the form of ”soft” biometric measures–typically user keystroke patterns. While
this demonstrates a significant advance in methodological flexibility over ”hard”
biometrics, both user and system must undergo a training period in which the
user becomes known to the system. This is a security system unlike a hard bio-
metric system, as it offers easy key revocation; however, the key revocation and
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re-issue process here yields two similar keys, due to the typing characteristics
of the end user. There must, then, be a system that is cognitively simple while
retaining a reasonable security level and possessing revocability that will not
compromise future keys.
Passwords and passphrases, when married with psychology and psycholin-
guistics, yield an authentication scheme that is revocable, memorable, and se-
cure. This research demonstrates the potential effectiveness, simplicity, and se-
curity involved in this authentication system through an information-theoretic
model that views authentication of a user as a shared secret between user and
machine. While this view is not new, the significant contribution that this work
makes is the acknowledgement of the user’s view of Self, and couples this with
a password and passphrase selection process that serves to enhance the shared
secret metaphor – in effect, the system becomes a confidant for the user with
respect to the chosen passphrase, and this helps ensure that a user will not vio-
late this dyadic relationship, as the user has become invested in the protection
of the shared secret.
2 Methodology
Successfully authenticating a user against a system has traditionally proven
a difficult yet fruitful research area. From inception, user authentication has
helped safeguard systems from unauthorized use. Traditionally, the require-
ment for doing so was one of cost efficiency, as legacy machines were expensive
to operate and processor time was correspondingly expensive. However, in more
recent years, the goal of user authentication has moved increasingly away from
protecting a centralized resource and more towards safeguarding smaller com-
puter systems, including personal computers, laptops, personal data assistants
(PDAs), and cellular phones. The rise in decentralized and near-ubiquitous
computing, coupled with the corresponding rise in machine interconnectedness
and bandwidth across the public Internet, has increased the attack surface that
each user on the network presents geometrically. As it is no longer uncom-
mon for one user to possess multiple computer and network accounts, users are
starting to feel somewhat overwhelmed with password policies that broker ac-
cess to these connections. In effect, from an information theoretic point of view,
password-based security systems are starting to decompose as further cognitive
demands are placed upon computer users.
The reality of user-side information overload, along with the realization that
there now exists a many-to-one relationship between targets and typical users,
paints a much larger target on the back of computer users. This is especially
poignant given that many users have a ”preferred” password that they register,
and later present, to each and every machine and network they contact. In
this fashion, a dedicated attacker no longer has to break, extort, or guess many
different authentication schemes, but only has to uncover the weakest one.
Authentication schemes provide a mechanism for a user to identify their
presence to an attached security system. The classical mechanisms that are
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most immediately familiar to users in everyday environments are what the user
knows, what the user has, and what the user is [3], [4]. ”Modern” research tends
to point away from the lowly password in favor of more recent authentication ap-
proaches; this research will not only examine password- and passphrase-based
authentication, but present a model through which their security may be in-
creased while simultaneously reducing cognitive load incumbent upon the end
user.
As this research methodology is presented, it is important to note that no
single system–even the information-theoretic model of passphrase-based secu-
rity proposed here–is able to guard against every potential security breach. For
instance, the first problem in password and passphrase assignment comes in the
form of key distribution. Needham & Schroeder [5] take some of the first steps in
computing to formalize and secure the steps involved in key distribution across
a network. However, the session key here is available for theft and, thereby,
for attack. For instance, without the Denning-Sacco [6] protocol extension, two
principles may be eavesdropped upon by a third party through a replay attack.
However, the Needham-Schroeder approach still provided for the first step to-
wards protocol and key-exchange refinement, and provided early groundwork
for Denning-Sacco and others to build upon. However, even the most robust
distribution scheme and memory-compatible password presents little challenge
to a shoulder-surfing thief. Hence, a series of specialized passwords–One-Time
Passwords–are introduced. Harris’s OPA [7] mechanism allows a user the option
of a disposable password.
Passwords as an Authentication Methodology Passwords work on the
principle that the security system shares a secret with an authorized user–and
this shared secret comes in the form of a password. Passwords are easy to em-
ploy, are not dependent upon anything external to the shared-secret concept to
work, and can potentially present a low cognitive barrier of entry for a prospec-
tive user. However, policy must appropriately drive password use, lest this form
of authentication present an easy target for an outside attacker. Appropriate
password use is a phrase used here as a catch-all that describes user education
and also conformity of the password to an accepted rigorous standard, where the
rigor of a password is traditionally measured by either its ability to withstand
attack or its conformity to a local policy.
The ability of a password to withstand attack is quantifiable through Ander-
son’s Formula [8] ((1) on page 3), which gives the relationship between password
complexity (measured in length and potential alphabet) and time required to
carry out a brute-force attack. P, in Anderson’s Formula, represents the prob-
ability of a successful attack. Typically, Anderson’s Formula is utilized wherein
P is set to 0.50, as this value serves as the mean run-time, Θ, between Ω and
O [9].
P ≥ (number of seconds)× (number of guesses per second)
(number of characters in password alphabet)password length
(1)
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Using this method, it becomes entirely possible to algebraically run this anal-
ysis in reverse to examine how long–and, therefore, how ”complex”–a password
ought to be to measure the average length of time it would take an attacker to
break the password using brute-force guessing techniques.
With respect to standards- and policy-compliance issues, a 1985 publication
by the United States Department of Defense [10] serves as the ”gold standard” of
password complexity available to a user. In this document, the suggestion that
user passwords be comprised of no less than 6 characters is made. Additionally
of note–and often overlooked in practice–is the allowance for ”user friendliness”
in the form of pronounceable passwords, as these passwords are often easier to
remember than entirely unpronounceable passwords. Indeed, such an approach
is entirely possible and conceptually simple through use of phonemes rather
than a more traditional alphabet.
Using these traditional views, then, a secure password ought to be exception-
ally long (which serves to defeat potential brute-force attacks through greatly
increasing the search space and, therefore, the total run-time via a mathematical
relationship between the two [8]). This is diagrammed in figure 1 on page 4.
Figure 1 – Simple Relationship Between
Password Complexity and Overall Security
However, increasing the password length with no regard for achieving parsi-
mony with what is known about chunking [11] from cognitive psychology inap-
propriately adds to the overall complexity of the password and, consequently,
makes the password more difficult for an end user to remember. This lapse in
memory, in turn, may lead to the end user writing down the password, thus
overcoming any additional security performance gain picked up through use of
a more complex password scheme. Therefore, it becomes apparent that the
relationship between provisioning for cognitive chunking and overall password
security is positive. The temptation, however, to comply with traditional ”pass-
word wisdom” and suggest that ease of recall and password security are at odds
with each other is refuted; instead, ease of recall is demonstrated as a proxy
measure. This emerging model is demonstrated in figure 2 on page 5.
Pass-phrases: Beyond Password Authentication Capitalizing on the
earlier systems’ success through the addition of some meaningful ”content-rich”
token to accompany the password itself to be used as a mnemonic device of sorts
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Figure 2 – Model of Overall Password
Security, Post- Chunking and Recall
(e.g. the Department of Defense [10] guideline suggesting that users verbalize
the password into something more immediately accessible, chunkable, and mem-
orable), Yan et al. [12] suggested the creation of strong passphrase-like strings.
These strings would be built out of cognitively simple and meaningful content,
such that even a ”gibberish” password of ”MDFNIR” can be created out of the
initial sentence ”My dog’s first name is Rex.”
This is an important point to bring to bear in a password system, as these
kinds of passwords are not found in a dictionary, and also have a high degree of
entropy. And these are also precisely the conditions that make for fast pro-active
password scanning [13] to actively improve the quality of accepted passwords.
In research, it has long been postulated that a flexible approach be taken with
respect to user passwords–however, as is typified by Saltzer [14], in the same
breath that flexibility is promoted, so too comes the view that this notion itself
is negatively correlated with security. For instance, in Saltzer’s research, total
mediation is given as a necessary condition for security, which does away with
the notion of credential caching, thus meaning that a user would have to type
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in a password many times in one computing session to gain full access over their
virtual domain.
For all the ease and simplicity that passwords give users and security ana-
lysts, the fact remains that many users are given minimal instruction on pass-
word selection. As such, individuals tend to pick passwords that fall into various
”classes”–an assertion uncovered by Petrie [15] and later re-tested ”in the wild”
on an e-commerce site [16]. All passwords used on this system by end users fell
into one of 7 distinct categories, or a catch-all ”other” category.
We have seen, above, how the use of a passphrase can act as an add-in to
the more traditional password, and this kind of marriage can result in passwords
with a high degree of entropy. Moreover, as passphrases may better resist being
forgotten [17], it seems that these ”extended-length passwords” make a good
trade-off between security and psychological acceptance for users and system
architects alike.
It is this aspect of passwords and passphrases, resistivity to forgetting, that
is of particular interest. To keep password load at a minimum, for example,
Kurzban’s cognitively simple and parsimonious system [18] may be utilized. If,
for instance, the fictitious user introduced at the start of this paper had to mem-
orize and use several different passwords or passphrases for different authentica-
tion sessions, this task would be made vastly easier through the structure given
here.
Biometrics–A More Secure Alternative? In discussing user authenti-
cation, it is tempting to suggest more secure alternatives to password- and
passphrase-based authentication, as passwords and passphrases are not novel,
and technology has clearly evolved since their inception. Biometrics have re-
cently come into vogue as an ”obvious” solution to the problem of user authen-
tication as they are proposed as being cognitively transparent while simulta-
neously leveraging the ”what the user is” aspect of authentication. However,
biometrics have their own dark secrets to harbor from the security community.
Biometrics, it should not be forgotten, still suffer from key distribution is-
sues that plague traditional security approaches–this fact is endemic in that
no amount of protocol design will do away with the fact that the two agents
involved–computer and user–must somehow be assured that the other exists
and that the other is indeed who they claim. The typical exemplar of biometric
systems, widely available for consumer and business use, is fingerprint recogni-
tion. In 2004, Uludag & Jain [19] presented work in which fingerprint biometric
systems were utterly broken and accepted an invalid principal as valid. Thus,
breaking biometric systems is within the realm of reason, and in fact these sys-
tems promote other, more insidious problems while hiding behind an artificial
cloak of security.
Bruce Schneier [20], in his comparison of traditional and biometric security
devices, elucidates and pierces this cloak. Using biometric measures such as
fingerprints, he argues, suffer from lack of secrecy and key re-issue problems.
Lack of secrecy in fingerprint scanners is a straight-forward concept, as the
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case might arise in which a user’s fingerprint becomes compromised due to the
fact that the oils leave a ”residual” pattern upon the scanning glass of the
biometric control device. This residual pattern, in fact, may be picked up with
relative ease through use of techniques ranging from the very simple employ of
facial mask gels and gummy bears to more advanced techniques involving photo-
lithography. To this end, the author has aided in and examined the former
method employed successfully by a non-expert. This problem, however, pales
in comparison to the one of key re-issue. If a password or passphrase becomes
compromised, it is reasonably simple to re-issue the user a new key. However,
in the event that a fingerprint is compromised, it is impossible to ”re-issue” the
user with another dominant-hand index finger; the alternative is to use another
digit, giving 10 possible ”re-issues” of keys. In this vein, re-identification also
becomes problematic in system design, as again the number of keys is physically
constrained at 10 per user.
Users, Mike Just argues [21], ought to
ha[ve] the flexibility and choice to control the personal information,
if any, that they provide [in their application for, or use of, an au-
thentication token].
Use of typical biometrics, especially fingerprint biometrics, takes away this
control of personal information by instead physically depositing this information
upon the fingerprint reader itself. Hence, through use of a direct key (e.g.
biometric token) rather than a proxy key to be used to identify the user (e.g.
passwords, passphrases, or another secret), the user loses flexibility and control
in use of personal information. Even though biometrics have been touted–
validly–as being more transparent to the end-user, there is no such thing as a
”free lunch” in security. Rather, within any authentication system lies certain
trade-offs and assumptions, and this point is examined best by O’Gorman [22],
who presents a simple and clean analysis of different security systems.
”Soft” biometrics, however, are not excluded in the same manner as the
above static, so-called ”hard” biometric measures that depend upon the user
being something fixed and unchanging. Rather, ”soft” biometrics make use
of a proxy measure, such as typing patterns, to identify a user. This field is
still emerging, but holds great promise as it can implicitly provide for a ”two-
phase” approach wherein a user still actively authenticates with a password or
passphrase, and passively authenticates using typing patterns. A solid analy-
sis comes in Figure 1 of Peacock et al.’s [23] research, which performs a mini
meta-analysis (by graphing false acceptance/rejection rates from other authors
working in-field) on the data presented about keystroke biometrics, and lays it
out for the reader in a reasonable and simple manner. As such, it becomes pos-
sible to zero in on approaches that perform well, and (re-)examine approaches
that are non-confirmatory to the other in-group studies. Likewise, Figure 2 in
this same research contains the cost to a user to ”enroll” in the systems pre-
sented in Figure 1. Keystroke biometric measures tend to make use of engines
that allow flexibility within the system, and these approaches have included
7
the use of Markov Models [24] and other data-mining and machine-learning
approaches, and the rhythm and cadence of typing [25], [26].
Beyond the Fingerprint and Keyboard–Other ”Soft” Biometrics In
attempting to escape passwords and passphrases, recent security research has
posited that perhaps image presentation would achieve the goal of user authen-
tication. In this type of authentication, a user would pick out an image from
a collage and identify it as ”their” image. However, unless image presentation
is properly randomized, the initial selection process of an image may well be
doomed, as research indicates handedness as a primary indicator of directional
choice in a T-maze [27]. While this may appear to have nothing to do with
security, this work extends and enriches the work by Robinson [28] that dealt
with museum patrons. Biological [29] explanations are not the cause of this
preference, nor are visual cues ([30]; [31]; [32]; [33]) in use.
However, Abed [34] measured the visual scanning (e.g. reading) patterns of
readers from different cultures, each having differing text directionality. West-
ern participants demonstrated more left-right saccades than members of cultures
wherein language is written top-to-bottom or right-to-left. In effect, this implies
that there exists a non-random component to saccades when individuals exam-
ine a computer monitor. This fact may be leveraged by an attacker examining
a visual authentication system that does not make use of randomized image
locations. Finally, it is the case that visual target acquisition presents a unique
problem in human factors research, and that ”sundries” such as monitor type
(e.g. Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) versus Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) technol-
ogy) may skew the visual search performance of a participant [35], which will
then introduce a bias into the image selection process.
Lessons Learned from Cognitive Psychology Thus far, passwords and
passphrases have been examined only from a viewpoint of maximizing informa-
tion retrieval based upon psycholinguistic cues. Just [21] flags applicability and
memorability as important measures of usability in a challenge-response authen-
tication framework, and this research has covered the latter thus far. Yet, there
exists another ”hook” into enhancing memory and recall of a target, and this
forms the crux of the model’s development–this notion, found in cognitive and
social psychology, is known as self-reference effect.
In self-reference and the encoding of personal information [36], Rogers et al.
tested subjects’ memory using lists of adjectives. Recall was greatly improved
when, as demonstrated in Heatherton et. al. [37], subjects were given the word
happy and this prompt was referenced back to the participant–does [the word]
happy describe you?–as opposed to being prompted does [the word] happy mean
the same as optimistic? This self-referential type of encoding results in a more
robust memory of the target–possibly because of the initial depth of processing
while the user is trying to reconcile this target with the user’s view of Self. Ob-
viously, there would seem to exist a certain ”latch” into creativity, imagination,
the visuo-spatial sketchpad, and simple recall when trying to determine how
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like a target the end user is, or (more appropriately), how this target integrates
with the end user and within their life experience. This study forms the basic
premise of the expanded password security model presented here: that there is
something inherently special about self-referenced prompts that vastly improves
their recall through their tie back to the user.
Following this initial probe, Kuiper & Rogers [38] found that memory recall
is enhanced for trait adjectives that are self-referent in nature, even when judg-
ments about them are not made at the time of presentation. This is important,
as it added to the earlier work through presenting this as more than a ”one-
time-party-trick”. Rather, the notion of the Self is so utterly important and
pervasive that it would appear to be a full-blown and hard-wired system within
the mind/brain that is always scanning, always looking for ways to integrate
the world into itself, and itself into the world.
It is not enough, ideally, that a passphrase should only provide high recall
for the user; rather, the passphrase itself ought to present a barrier to being
revealed to a third party by the user. In many organizations today, users are
left with a devalued sense of password and passphrase importance. The realiza-
tion that this one ”key” can be presented to the system by a foreign user who
may then utilize the target’s information for gain tends to be less immediate
than the knowledge that conforming to password and security policy is largely
painful for end users. These end users have no real ”connection” to their pass-
words, thus users have repeatedly proven that these passwords are, in practice,
worthless. Indeed, in a survey conducted at a security conference (USENIX),
70% of respondents happily gave their passwords away for a bar of chocolate, a
pen, or other cheap baubles of remuneration. An unscrupulous attacker could
then leverage their newly-gained system access and take, alter, or destroy both
data and infrastructure. Clearly, this kind of dissociation from passwords and
passphrases (or any other kind of ”token” presented to a system for authenti-
cation) creates very real and critical security issues for an organization.
Secrecy Helps People Maintain Their Personal [Electronic] Boundaries. This
section heading in Kelly & McKillop’s [39] research on revealing personal secrets,
when taken in context with the task at hand, provides a platitude that will light
the stage and provide the ambiance for the real meat of this research, which
is precisely how to go about maintaining and preserving personal boundaries
through electronic secret-holding. It is simple (and common) enough to assert
that ”a system is most secret when all its members act in secretive manners”,
but this assertion provides little in the way of actual and substantive value. In
this research, I have been working on a common theme–the dyadic relationship
between human and computer. This relationship inherits elements from human-
human relationships, including trust [both in the human and computer security
implications of the word], [the potential for both sides to exercise] poor judgment,
and discretion. All these elements, of course, surround a common theme; the
human actor and the computer share a common secret, and are in this way
confederates. Moreover, it becomes a not unnatural connection to discover
that, just as individuals are psychologically geared to feel ”relief” and ”a load
taken off their shoulders” upon divulgence of a secret, so too does this notion
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follow through to user-attacker human dyads. If, as Kelly & McKillop point
out, it is the case that disclosure and personally damning nature of the secret
are directly related, then it stands to reason that a ”strong” secret would be
one that would utterly compromise or otherwise violate or intrude upon the
individual involved. Hence, the original assertion that I made, in which I stated
the seemingly intuitively obvious point that users would likely feel a stronger
”tie” with passwords and phrases that were tightly coupled within their realm
of experience than random passwords and phrases, has support.
This support at first appears only partial, yet when the computer is brought
on as the compliment to the individual, then the picture falls into place very
rapidly. It is clear, if users can so completely allow themselves to interact with
a machine - without accepting anthropomorphic fallacy as the root cause–as
is demonstrated in Nass & Moon’s work [40]–then so too is it entirely within
the realm of logic and reason that the users are carrying out a social interaction
with the machines they contact. What this rejection of anthropomorphic fallacy
obviates is an explanation into why computer users think their monitor, mouse,
keyboard, and computer are ascribing human attributes to these bits of plastic,
glass, and metal. This is a good direction to take, as it is clear that computer
users do not ”think” of their computers as human or human-esque, but it is still
the case that there exists a human-like interaction between user and system.
In effect, through using passwords and passphrases–as with any authentica-
tion scheme reliant upon a shared secret–users implicitly trust the machine and
associated paraphernalia to maintain the shared secret, no matter how many
times an attacker asks the machine to divulge it. The security community, how-
ever, appears to be doing a great injustice to users and security architects alike
through not first finding, then explaining, and finally encouraging this form of
interaction between security principal (user) and device (machine).
3 Finalizing the Proposed Model
To this point, the research has focused primarily upon providing support for
passwords and passphrases as a valid avenue of user authentication, even in
light of newer technologies. Through the leveraging of cognitive psychology,
it is possible to bind a token that is both personal and important while still
providing only a proxy for access to a specific user. In this way, system access
can remain secure in the aspect that access is brokered through a shared se-
cret between user and machine, while still upholding tenets of design presented
in Mike Just’s research. It is important, too, to make note of the fact that
designing security systems should not be a static process; rather, as Yee [41]
points out, the security system may instead be designed in a manner similar to
the approach of the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC). A proponent of
SDLC, Enger [42] presents five distinct and discrete stages of development that a
system should traverse before release. These stages provide a structured frame-
work for systems development within which revisions, reviews, and feedback
may take place. However, this framework acts as rigid scaffolding surrounding
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the work, and is therefore not necessarily the best approach to take or model
in all instances. In Yee’s research, a sort of ”amoebic” cognitive model is em-
ployed that demonstrates the acceptable action points (e.g. states in a Finite
State Machine) that are available to a user of the system. This ”amoebic” ap-
proach is actually quite cognitively correct, as security has been talked about
as ”engulfing” or ”encompassing” different target points and/or users. Security
by admonition and security by designation are brought out as topics of system
design. What makes this approach compelling–and potentially lucrative–is that
this parallels the research into Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) modeling (the
evolution of ”dyadic relationships” in management) that was initially founded
by Bass [43], and later extended [44]. Hence, it is preferable to enforce secu-
rity through designed control than through admonition and rigid, over-reaching,
or potentially draconian policies. This approach will receive the same kind of
”employee buy-in” that its analogue in LMX–Transformational Leadership [44],
[45]–receives, and this notion of control is preferable to policy-driven approaches
of system security via passwords or passphrases in that it effectively brings the
system in as the second acting principal in what effectively becomes a dyadic
relationship between user and machine. This is an effective strategy for pre-
venting user password or passphrase divulgence, as this security-as-relationship
view brings to bear secret-keeping with respect to oneself. Again, as a model of
Self becomes increasingly more integral in the key presented to a principal, the
ramifications of disclosure become magnified, such that a ”security” breach–a
user giving out their password or passphrase to an un-trusted party outside the
system-user dyad–transmutes instead into divulgence of a personal secret.
A dyadic relationship, taken in a human-human construct, leaves itself open
to plausible deniability thwarting the fear involved in a particularly outlandish
or unlikely secret being revealed. However, it is important to take note of the
fact that with a computer system acting as the second principal in a dyadic
relationship, plausible deniability is removed as a potential confound from the
system, as well as the overall nature of secret-telling in life: ephemerality. For
instance, all that one has to do to dispute that a human-borne secret ”belongs”
to them is either to simply deny that the other party has knowledge, or better
still, to deny the secret itself. It is this notion of ephemerality that gives human-
human trust dyads the confound of later repudiation: the value of holding a
secret is largely nullified if its veracity cannot be determined by an outsider.
Hence, the value of keeping that secret is also decreased, as its potential for
damage is mitigated by its transparency, especially in a dyad possessing an
inequity between parties (e.g. employer-employee relationships).
4 Discussion
In this research, I have provided links between overall password/passphrase
security and different factors, such as password length, password complexity,
ability of a user to recall their password, meaningfulness of the password, and
resistivity to secret divulgence through use of highly personal and ”sensitive”
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information. Tying this information about the user’s Self to the underlying
construct of non-repudiation gives the finalized model displayed in figure 3 on
page 17 (with repudiation, as is seen in human-human secret-keeping dyads, a
”repudiation” node would be present and would be negatively correlated to the
security of the resulting secret–here, a password or passphrase).
We understand from literature that there exist consequences for secret disclo-
sure, yet also that individuals are prone to tell secrets as a cathartic experience.
However, when the secrets involve central constructs and components of the
Self, and with removal of both repudiation and the ”prisoner’s dilemma” (as is
the case when the secret confidant is a computer system rather than another hu-
man), secrets are both better protected and more potentially disastrous, should
they be released. What this means for computer security is that the answer to
user sharing and divulgence of shared secrets–thus providing access into the sys-
tem itself to an unauthorized party–comes not at the price of policy and control,
but more distributed and self-governing methodologies that tie into constructs
of Self.
Coupled with this approach is the view that a user and computer system
share a dyadic and symbiotic relationship; system and user share a secret and
hold this secret in trust. As this secret is representative of a tightly-held and
ephemeral psychometric rather than an observable biometric, this approach is
secure from attack by inspection or release.
5 Conclusion
While there has been a recent surge of interest away from cumbersome and com-
plex authentication schemes, research focus has tended away from such ”simple”
mechanisms as passwords and passphrases. This tendency is perhaps prema-
ture and in error; at AMCIS 2005, two interesting presentations were given
that addressed both the selection [16] and effectiveness [17] of passwords and
passphrases. Password and passphrase selection has been described as falling
into functional categories (as in [16], extending [15]). However, to date, the
effect of social and cognitive psychology on password selection has been lacking,
and psycholinguistic examination has been largely relegated to phoneme selec-
tion. This research demonstrates the potential for future and refined study of
passwords and passphrases as a secure shared secret authentication mechanism
when taken with the methodological framework given.
With the adoption of this framework, employee disclosure of system-access
keys would diminish, as would employee requests for password and passphrase
re-issue. Contrast this environment against the more traditional wrapper for
securing passwords by making them unintelligible through policy. This results
in vast resources being required to maintain such a system–after all, it is difficult
to remember a 30-character mixed-case, alpha-numeric string containing special
characters as Xf033 99!YU&XmqZPlˆ3j2Yxv4FPw7. Given this, employees
either resort to defeating system security completely through use of handwrit-
ten and posted notes at their workstation, or make use of corporate ”help-desk”
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functions to re-issue their password–which, in turn, is subsequently either for-
gotten or written down. Add to this the current slew of policies that mandate
password expiration after one to six months, and this issue becomes magnified
further. The best scenario painted here is one in which an employee only writes
their password down, or only calls a dedicated help-desk for assistance–the worst
scenario would come with employees sharing password and login information
(which is then likely written down); if everyone has the login information, then
the nuisance of calling a help-desk is avoided. However, this completely and ut-
terly breaks the system with respect to its ultimate goal of matching access and
user, and being able to constrain and bind the two facets of use to a common
key (here, a password or passphrase) through appropriate policy.
This paints a bleak picture; passwords and passphrases, however, can be
secure, memorable, and impervious to release. A 30-character strong password
with high entropy was given above; the passphrase
The first time I went to the beach in Florida was great; with the
sun, sand, and surf, I felt like Camus!
not only exceeds entropy and character counts, but is exceptionally ”chunk-
able” and cognitively lightweight, as it provides an event that latches into some
notion of Self about the user. As demonstrated, this marriage is good for the
environment in which the system is placed, good for the end user, and good for
security.
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